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Ramachandran Rejects in Sabarimala Reference, Champions Individual Rights Over Excommunication
In a pivotal submission before a nine-judge bench of the in the ongoing Sabarimala reference, has forcefully argued that the term "morality" in cannot be equated with societal or . Doing so, he cautioned, would unleash majoritarian notions to curtail religious freedoms, undermining the Constitution's core ethos. Appearing for the reformist , Ramachandran mounted a robust challenge to the practice of excommunication, terming it a regressive tool that inflicts "" on individuals through social and economic boycotts, thereby violating fundamental principles of equality, liberty, and dignity. His arguments, presented last week, emphasize "" as the guiding light for interpreting religious freedoms, prioritizing individual rights under over denominational privileges under Article 26.
This intervention revives longstanding tensions between group rights and personal liberties in India's constitutional framework for religion, potentially reshaping jurisprudence on .
Background: The Sabarimala Reference and Excommunication Disputes
The Sabarimala saga began with the Supreme Court verdict in , which by a 4:1 majority struck down the Kerala temple's ban on women of menstruating age as violative of gender equality and Article 25. Dissenting voices, including then Justice Indu Malhotra, called for a larger bench to delineate "." This reference, now before a , probes deeper questions on the scope of Articles 25 (freedom of religion) and 26 (religious denominations' rights to manage affairs).
Parallel to Sabarimala runs the Dawoodi Bohra excommunication dispute. Rooted in a writ petition challenging the majority ruling in Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay —which invalidated the , as infringing —Ramachandran seeks reform. The practice, he argues, persists as a tool of denominational control, excommunicating dissenters and imposing severe secular penalties.
Redefining 'Morality': Constitutional Ethos Over Majoritarian Sentiments
At the heart of Ramachandran's plea is the interpretation of "morality" as a restriction on religious freedoms under . He vehemently opposed reading it as "social/societal/," warning of dire consequences.
"If morality as used under Articles 25 and 26 were to be read as social/societal/
, this would open the door for religious freedoms to be curtailed on the basis of majoritarian notions which are untethered to constitutional text, and that this would result in an even more amorphous judicial inquiry,"
he submitted.
Instead, "morality" must embody —the "internal principles" of the Constitution, rooted in equality (), liberty (), and dignity (). These principles evolve but remain anchored in text.
"The Constitution cannot restrict any fundamental freedom based on an irrational majoritarian sentiment. Neither can any 'religious' understanding of morality be imported to restrict religious freedoms, since that would render the word 'morality' irrelevant. Understanding morality in the context of the Constitutional principles is the only consistent, rational, and lawful way to restrict fundamental freedoms,"
Ramachandran asserted.
He likened to the "ethos" or "conscience" of the Constitution, a value-based tool for adjudication, not a rigid test. Responding to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant's query on elevating it above other values or using it to strike down laws, Ramachandran clarified: it aids interpretation of fundamental rights, harmonizing , not overriding.
This stance echoes Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's vision of as fraternity and tolerance, transcending transient societal norms—a principle increasingly invoked in modern rulings like (decriminalizing homosexuality).
Excommunication as '': Secular Impacts Trump Religious Facade
Ramachandran dissected excommunication not as purely religious but as a practice with profound secular repercussions. While denominations may discipline adherents, it cannot extend to ""—mandatory boycotts severing marriages, family ties, businesses, institutions, and even burial rights.
"It is clearly in violation of any standard of morality based on the principles of equality, liberty, and dignity of the individual, and therefore cannot be protected under
or
,"
he declared.
Though triggered by religious non-adherence, its effects are "secular and social," disentitling it from Article 26 protection. Invoking the —prescribed in and refined in privacy jurisprudence—Ramachandran urged a multi-pronged test: Is it a ""? If yes, assess the practice's extent, prohibition's impact on individual rights, and least-restrictive alternatives.
"A practice which is conducted in response to secular and social actions of an individual, or which has significant secular and social consequences for that individual, cannot be the subject of Constitutional protection under A.25 and consequently cannot be a '
' under A.26,"
he explained.
Interplay of Articles 25 and 26: Individual-Centric Constitution Prevails
Ramachandran aligned with 's view: Article 26 derives from , the fount of all religious freedoms. Rights in are not "watertight compartments" but must be read harmoniously, with individual dignity paramount.
"Any interpretation of the Constitution that undermines this core commitment to the dignity of the individual cannot stand,"
he echoed Khambata. In irreconcilable conflicts, denominational rights yield to Articles 14, 19, 21.
Preferring Chief Justice B.P. Sinha's minority dissent in
—which prioritized individual liberty over group excommunication—he urged rejection of the majority's group-favoring stance.
"This Court has never declared that a denominational right should be consistently favoured over an individual right to religion,"
Ramachandran noted.
Judicial Scrutiny: Probing Questions from the Bench
The bench actively engaged. Justice Nagarathna questioned the basis for challenging 's 4:1 majority and whether excommunication is secular or religious. Ramachandran maintained its overall impact matters.
On the
petition's maintainability—raised via a "note of protest"—he dismissed it as extraneous to the reference, attributing delays to excommunication's chilling fear:
"Generations of persons have suffered excommunication, and it takes courage to approach the Court."
Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Kumar queried review absences post- , underscoring procedural hurdles in reform.
Legal Analysis: A Paradigm Shift in Religious Jurisprudence?
Ramachandran's arguments signal a potential pivot from Shirur Mutt ()'s "essential practices" test towards a dignity-infused, proportionality-driven framework, post- (right to privacy). By subordinating Article 26 to individual safeguards, it counters majoritarian risks in diverse India—e.g., preventing temple entry bans or caste-based exclusions via "."
Critically, it revives critique: the majority insulated excommunication as "essential," but evolving norms (equality post-44th Amendment) demand revisit. Aligning with Sabarimala majority's progressive tilt, this could embolden petitions against similar practices in Parsi panchayats, Sikh akal takhts, or Christian excommunications.
Impacts on Legal Practice and Justice System
For practitioners, this offers a toolkit: invoke to pierce "religious" veneers on discriminatory rites; demand proportionality audits in Art 26 claims. Litigators in religious reform (e.g., triple talaq successors) gain ammunition favoring individuals.
Broader: Reinforces Constitution's "individual-centric" arc, checking sectarian overreach amid rising identity politics. If accepted, it mandates granular scrutiny—religious nexus proof, rights-balancing—elevating judicial role without "policing theology," per Ramachandran.
Yet challenges loom: Overreach risks, as J Nagarathna hinted; maintainability bars in old suits.
Conclusion: Towards a Dignity-First Religious Freedom
Ramachandran's tour de force posits as liberty's bulwark against majoritarianism and denominational tyranny. As the bench deliberates, its echo could liberate individuals from archaic fetters, affirming the Constitution's transformative promise. Legal eagles await a verdict balancing faith's pluralism with personal autonomy.
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